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HINTS UPON PRACTICE IN APPEALS.*
To address a body of students on the subject of practice
in appeals may seem somewhat like beginning at the wrong
end of things, though perhaps, looking at a modern building in process of construction with the solid stone-work
coming downward from the sky, it may not seem altogether out of the current fashion. But to a lecturer whose
time, like my own, is much engrossed with daily and imperative duties the 'subject must needs be one which is
familiar, and for this one, partly suggested by your faculty,
perhaps my best apology will be the hope that all of you
may have early and frequent occasion to utilize these remarks in actual experience.
Teaching practice by theory has some inherent difficulties. You will allow me to quote some words of my own
on a similar occasion some years ago: "The law has gen* An address delivered on the invitation of the Alumni of the Law
Department of the University of Pennsylvania, April is,19o4, by the
Hon. James T. Mitchell, Chief Justice of Pennsylvahia.
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eral principles, capable of scientific and methodical state-

ment in a condensed form which shall nevertheless contain
the germ from which all its minutest ramifications may be
logically developed. But practice is not general; it is a
mass of particulars; nor will logical deduction, even by
the strongest reason, be at all sure in its steps from one
point to another." On theoretical or general questions of
law the advocate has a free range. A fresh mind may
strike out a new thought even on an ancient topic, though
that is not often to be expeded, and it is dangerous to deal
with a case on such possibility. But you are at liberty to
try, and the consequences of failure are not disastrous.
But practice regards the facilitation of business,-your own,
your adversary's, and the court's,-and all must work to the
same end, or the result will be confusion. Hence it depends
largely on mutual convenience as determined by experience.
Practice involves two things-first, what to do, and,
secondly, how to do it, both of which, especially the latter,
are absolute and follow the precedents. These are the
results of years and experience, and have common-sense
back of them.
A talk upon practice would not be of much use unless
it is really practical. My aim, therefore, this evening, is
not to attempt to give you a systematic treatise on practice,
but rather to suggest to you, in an informal way, points, or
hints I will call them, on practical matters that you may
not readily find in the books, and thus to do in a measure
what oral argument does for the argument in the paper
books, give vitality and precedence to the really important
things.
First, study your case carefully before taking your appeal. When the attorney, filled with his client's view of
the case, loses it, he is apt to feel sore, to blame the court,
and to rush- into an appeal. There are few questions which
fail to have two sides, and long dwelling on one, as it is
the advocate's duty and inclination to do, tends to persuade
counsel that it is the strongest one. After a while you
learn to appreciate the fact that you cannot always be on
the right side, and to accept defeat with equanimity.
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Therefore it is a good rule to allow a little time for disappointment to cool off, and study your case with a fresh
view of the other side as well as your own before taking
an appeal. I .do not mean that you are not to keep on
studying it after the appeal. On my making a remark
once to the late Chief Justice Sharswood how often it
occurred that cases raising the same question were reported
in the Same volume, he said, "Don't you know that in
the law it never rains but it pours?" Similar circumstances are producing similar questions and similar results,
and while your appeal is pending the Supreme Court may
decide the question in some other case. Perhaps once or
twice a term it occurs that counsel say the point has been
decided since they took their appeal, or the Court informs
them that the point has been argued and decided during
the current term. It is always well, therefore, to keep a
lookout for fresh cases reported from week to week and
not yet in the digests.
Having determined to appeal, the first question is, to
what court? This is not so easy a matter as it looks, and
the question of jurisdiction requires careful attention. The
Superior Court act has been in force nearly nine years,
and yet mistakes occur every term. The act oi the 24th
of June, 1895, P. L. 212, gave exclusive and final jurisdiction to the Superior Court inter alia. in "all actions,
claims, and disputes of every kind

.

.

if the value of

the real or personal property, or the amount of money
really in controversy in any single action or claim, is not
greater than $iooo." In determining jurisdiction the
judgment in actions of* tort is conclusive of the amount
unless it be for defendant on a verdict, or a nonsuit, when
the damages laid in the statement decide it. In actions not
directly for money, such as ejectment, etc., or for the possession of property, the judge's certificate determines the
amount in controversy.' Rules 2o and 21 of the present
rules of the Supreme Court provide for the certificate and
this has rarely givei any trouble. The certificate is indispensable, and the agreement of parties as to the value of
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the property is not a substitute. Matthews v. Rising, 194
Pa. 217.
The phrase "amount really in controversy" raised questions at once. In torts the act provided the test of the
verdict or claim, but in actions ex contractu, if there was
a nonsuit or a verdict for defendant, what was the suim
in controversy, the damages alleged, or the sum apparently
called for by the instrument or contract sued on? If the
plaintiff claimed $3ooo, for instance, and got $iooo, but
defendant denied that he bwed anything, what was the
sum in controversy? These and similar questions were
solved by the Supreme Court by adopting the test of the
difference to appellant between the judgment appealed from
and the judgment sought in the Supreme Court. This was
a logical test, though even it would not always have produced a uniform result. But the act of May 5, 1899, P. L.
248; provided that the amount of the judgment, decree,
or award shall be the conclusive test. " In any- suit, distribution, or other- proceeding in the Common Pleas or
Orphans' Court, if -the plaintiff or claimant recover damages either for a tort or for a breach of contract, the
amount of the judgment, decree, or award shall be conclusive proof of the amount really in controversy, but if
he recover nothing, the amount really in controversy shall
be determined by the amount of damages claimed in the
statement of claim or in the declaration." Under this act
it was held in Prentice v. Hancock, 204 Pa. 130: ".The
Legislature intended to provide in these two paragraphs
for standards of proof in two classes which should include
every possible case, first, issues involving title or possession
of specific property, real or personal, and, second, issues
involving the payment of money." No phrase has yet been
applied or even suggested which will determine the amount
really in controversy with absolute uniformity in regard to
the question of jurisdictiorf. Thus, for illustration, where
the amount claimed by two distributees is more than $1500
and the' decree is adverse to them, they cannot unite in an
appeal, but each must take his separate appeal to the Sup-er;, r Court, though had the decision been in their favor
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the residuary legatee or other party from whose share the
entire sum would come would be entitled to an appeal to
the Supreme Court: Staib's Estate, 188 Pa. 238. So,
again, suppose in an action of tort, with damages claimed
at $5000, the plaintiff obtains a verdict and judgment for
$5oo, if defendant appeals the amount in controversy is
clearly $5oo, but if the plaintiff appeals it is, or may be,
$4500: Weaver v. Cone, 189 Pa. 298. Thus in both'the
supposed cases the appellate jurisdiction would depend on
the party appealing, and in the second case, if both parties
should appeal, we should have the same judgment going
for final adjudication to two different courts.
"To remedy these discrepancies and get as nearly as
practicable a uniform rule, the act of 1899 fixes the amount
of a money judgment in any kind of proceeding as conclusive proof of the amount really in controversy. It may
not always determine the amount with absolute accuracy,
but it constitutes a uniform standard for the determination
of the appellate jurisdiction, and has the advantage of
being fixed, definite, and of easy application :" Prentice v
Hancock, supra. It is not, however, always as easy as it at
first seemed.
Having settled the matter of the court, you have next
to consider the nature of the error by which you are
harmed, and the process by which you can get it rectified.
I pass over the subject of new trials, which are the appropriate remedy for mistakes of fact in general, for verdicts
against the weight of evidence, etc., as not within the scope
of the present occasion. Broadly speaking, the Supreme
Court reviews only the law, and does this in one of three
forms-certiorari, writ of error, or appeal properly socalled. It is true that the process now by the act of May 9,
1889, P. L. 158, is all called by the same name, an appeal.
In commenting on that act the Chief Justice of that day
with a directness and force characteristic of his style said
(In rc the act of May, 1889, 25 Weekly Notes 361):
"Instead of simplifying proceedings in this court the act
of 1889 has produced nothing but confusion. It was not
called for by any great need, it was not asked for by this
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court, nor by any considerable number of the members of
the bar who practised therein, and it serves no useful purpose," and in Rand v. King, 134 Pa. 641, the late Justice
Williams said: "Prior to the act of May, 1889, there were
three of these (forms of appeal) in common use, and the
peculiar characteristics of each were well understood by
the professiofi. That most generally employed was the
writ of error, which lay against any' final judgment in any
court of record and against such interlocutory and auxiliary
orders as have been made reviewable upon it by statute.
On this writ the judgment is reviewed with reference to
alleged errors which are pointed out by exceptions taken to
the action of the trial court at the time when the rulings
are made, and as a general iule the power of the Supreme
Court is limited to the questions so raised: Warsaw Tp.
Poor D. v. Knox Tp. Poor D., 107 Pa. 301. In all equity
cases and those following'the equity forms an appeal from
the decree complained of is the proper mode-of review.
It brings up the pleadings and the evidence on which the
decree rests, and makes it necessary for the appellate court
to examine, and see whether the decision is just and conscionable on the case that was presented to the chancellor
who made it. The remaining method was by writ of
certiorari. This writ brought up the record in any given
case for review and correction, but it brought the record
only: Carlson's License, 127 Pa. 330; Holland v. White,
120 Pa. 228. The errors to be corrected must appear on
the face of the record: Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa. 403; and
the merits cannot be inquired into upon this writ, but are
left to the judgment of the court below: Election Cases,
65 Pa. 2o. Neither the opinion of the court nor the evidence forms any part of the record proper, and for that
reason they will not be examined on certiorari: Holland
v. White, supra. The character of the proceeding to be
reviewed suggested, therefore, the method to be adopted
and the limits within which the practitioner should direct
his preparation.
"Since the act of 1889 these modes remain applicable in
the same cases-, within the same limits, and with the same
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effect as before, the only difference being that now they
are all called by the same name. The act provides 'that
all appellate proceedings in the Supreme Court heretofore
taken by writ of error, appeal, or certiorari shall hereafter
be taken in a proceeding to be called an appeal.' It will
be noticed that this act does not profess to extend the right
of review, to change its extent in cases already provided
for, or to modify in any manner its exercise. It simply
provides that dissimilar proceedings shall be called by the
same name. An appeal in name may therefore be a writ
of error or a certiorari in legal effect, and it is necessary
in every case to look into the record and determine at the
outset of our examination whether what is 'called an
appeal' is such in fact, or is a writ of error or a certiorari.
The practical effect of calling proceedings so essentially
unlike by the same name is to obscure and divert attention
from the peculiar characteristics of each. This increases
the sense of uncertainty on the part of the practitioner,
and the labor on the part of the appellate court."
After fifteen years of experience of the act these are
still the views of the court. The act has probably done no
great harm, but it has certainly done no good. It saves
indolent counsel the trouble of considering what his writ
should be called, but it puts on the court the labor of looking into the real nature of the appeal, whether though
the voice is Jacob's voice the hands are the hands of Esau.
This labor, not great in any one case, perhaps, when it has
to be done six or seven hundred times a year becomes burdensome to the court and is no real benefit to the practitioner, and it carries with it a certain amount of danger to
the student and the inexperienced practitioner.
The assignments of error in modern practice constitute
pretty much all the pleadings. They are analogous to the
narr or statement from which the court learns the cause
of action. When you reach this point I cannot urge you
too strongly to study the rules of court. They do not contain all the law of the land, but they do contain nearly all
the law of practice on the subjects which they cover. Study
them, therefore, as you studied the multiplication table,
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which admits of no variation or exception. I do not say
that the rules are as inelastic as the multiplication table,
but elasticity is not their quality and variations are dangerous. Besides, the great principle never to be forgotten is,
that it is just as easy to do a thing the right way as the
wrong, and very much safer. Therefore study your rules
of court with the full conviction that they mean exactly
what they say, and follow them literally. Don't allow
yourself to do something that you think is an equivalent
or just as good. With your mind full of your view of the
case something may seem an equivalent to you which will
not seem so to your adversary, with his mind full of a
different view, and he may point out variances and shortcomings, and, what is worse for you, the court may agree
with him. You may think that this is making rather too
much of a small point, but the number of men who ought
to know better, who find themselves in trouble every term
of court by carelessness in this respect, demonstrates the
necessity of emphasis.
Rtble ii requires counsel for appellant on or before the
third day of the term "to specify in writing the particular
errors which he assigns" and file them in the Prothonotary's office. This is indispensable, as errors not specifically
assigned, no matter how plain or how important, are disregarded. As already said, the assignments are the declaration of your cause of action, what is not irthem is not
before the court. Errors not properly assigned in accordance with the rules are treated as not assigned at all.
By rule 29 each error relied on must be specified particularly and by itself. If any specification embrace more
than one point, or refer to more than one bill of exceptions,
or raise more than one distinct question, it shall be considered a waiver of all the errors so alleged. No matter
how closely connected points may be, they must be assigned
separately. "An assignment of error specifying that the
court erred in refusing defendant's second and third points,
both of which are recited therein, offends against rule 29
in that it embraces more than one point, and is therefore
a waiver of both alleged errors," Crawford v. McKinney,
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165 Pa. 6o5, and in assignments to answers to points the
point itself must be given in immediate connection with the
answer.
By rule 30, when the error assigned is to the charge of
the court or to answers to points, the part of the charge
or the points and answers referred to must be quoted totidem verbis in the specification. Under this rule it is highly
important to avoid giving detached or incomplete portions
of the charge, or running such parts together when they
seem to relate to the same question or the same rule of law.
It may be unfair and is always dangerous: Commonwealth
v. Eckerd, 174 Pa. 137; Commonwealth v. Zappe, 153 Pa.

498. In your assignments therefore quote the charge or
the answers to points not only with scrupulous accuracy,
but with enough of the context to make it entirely clear
that you have given the meaning correctly.
By rule 31, when the error assigned is to the admission
or rejection of evidence the specification must quote the
questions or offers, the ruling of the court thereon. and the
testimony or evidence admitted, if any, together with a
reference to the page of the paper book where the matter
may be found in its regular order in the printed evidence
or notes of trial. The reason of this rule is plain. The
court must have the offer or the evidence before it, otherwise it will not appear how its rejection or admission would
be injurious to the appellant (Bailey v. Pittsburgh, 207
Pa. 553), and the court must have its information there
without having to hunt for it in the appendix. Then there
should always be, as the rule requires, a reference to where
it can be found in the notes of testimony, so that it can
be read in connection with the preceding or following context if it should be so desired.
The most laborious and probably the most important of
all the matters with which we are concerned is the preparation of your paper books. I would again repeat the caution
to study thoroughly the rules of court. They are the
ultimate authority on questions of practice. Departures
from settled forms are dangerous, and even if they have no
serious consequences at the moment, they have to justify
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themselves, which takes time, and time is the essence of
life in the Supreme Court as well as elsewhere. In the,
accustomed forms the trained eye gets at the substance
of the case in a glance. Nothing, for instance, could be
simpler than the common counts and the bill of particulars,
a mode of statement resulting from centuries of experience
and efforts of as acute intellects as ever devoted themselves
to human affairs. Now each individual, learned and skilful, or otherwise as it may be, states the case in his own
way, and instead of having the story told in accurate phrase
by a trained mind knowing what is relevant or irrelevant,
what is material or immaterial, you have it told, as a distinguished English judge said, "Just as one old woman
would tell it to another." Even the experienced must read
closely to see whether it is a special- narr or just the common
counts beclouded with verbiage. So it is with departures
in matters of practice: they waste time and attention that
could be easily saved by correct practice.
The requirements of paper books are distinctly and authoritatively prescribed, together with the order in which
they should be arranged in appeals from judgment on a
verdict, which is the example mutatis mutandis for all other
appeals, in rule 19: First, the names of all the parties as
they stood on the record of the court below at the time of
the trial, with the addition of the word appellant after
the name of the party taking the appeal; second, an abstract
of the proceedings showing the form of the action, the
docket entries, the issue and how it was made; third, the
verdict of the jury and the judgment thereon; fourth, a
statement of the question involved; fifth, the history of the
case; sixth, the charge of the court with the points, if any,
wh.ich were submitted in writing to the court below; seventh, the specifications of error; eighth, a brief of argument
for the appellant; ninth, an appendix containing the evidence and the pleadings in full, including any opinion of
the court below filed in the case.
The ft.-st will be referred to further on.
The second, the abstract of the proceedings, means the
docket entries, the nature of the action, and the form in
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which it came up for determination, as, for instance, on a
rule for judgment, on demurrer, on verdict of a jury, etc.
Third, the verdict, if any, and judgment thereon needs
no comment.
Fourth, the statement of the question involved is the
key to the front door of the case, the natural and proper
entrance. This requirement is one of the most important
and one. of the most rigid. The court when the case is
called has no knowledge of it whatever, and the first thing
is to learn what it is about. The question involved, therefore, is a convenience to the court and an indispensable
requirement of the paper book, but it is also good practice
for yourselves to get a clear view of the real question in the
case. It is a study in the art of elimination of details not
really material. It must state the question, as prescribed in
rule 26, "in the briefest and most general terms, without
names, dates, amounts, or particulars of any kind whatever.
It should not exceed six or eight lines and must not under
any circumstances exceed half a page." The rule is rigidly
enforced. In the very late case of Roush's Estate, 23
Super. Ct. 652, the paper book was suppressed and the
appeal non prossed for want of a statement of the question,
and at the present term in the case of H. v. T., not yet
reported, the same action was taken by the Supreme Court
for violation of that part of the rule which limits the length
to half a page. The history of the case was originally
intended to develop this feature, but the custom having
become inveterate to make this too full of details the court
adopted the new requirement, and does not intend to let
it be frittered away in the same manner. It is due to the
profession to say here to its credit that the way in which
the rule has been received and followed is exceedingly
gratifying. When it was first prescribed it was anticipated
that it might take the bar some time to grasp its full meaning and to adapt themselves to it. The Prothonotary of
the Western District said to me: "What! If you tell
Blank"-naming a well-known learned but rather longwinded member of the bar,-" if you tell Blank that he
must state the ,ubstance of his case in half a page you will
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frighten him .to death." But the intrinsic merits of the
requirement were promptly recognized, the paper books
seldom transgressing, and nearly always stating the question with such accuracy that the other side acquiesces in the
statement of the appellant.
The next requirement, the history of the case, allows
more latitude in the relation of facts, but it is still intended
to be a legal history, setting forth -only iuch facts -as aie
material to show what the controversy was, and how it came
about. Under rule 28 it must not contain argumefit'or afiy
portion of the testimony. Here again is opportunity for
practice in the clear, orderly, and concise narration of facts
and the elimination of details. It will be worth to you all
the trouble you take in regard to it. Actual dates, amounts,
or figures of any kind are rarely important. Apart from
the statute of limitations or similar questions, the only
relevancy or importance of dates depends usually upon their
priority. Qui prior in tempore potior in jure. Therefore
in your history study the true use of dates, give them clearly
with such prominence as they merit, but do not overload
your narrative with those not really important. And the
same remark applies generally to amounts, names, etc., and
similar details.
The provision as to the charge needs no explanation except the caution to see that it is accurately printed and in
full.
Specifications of error I have already considered.
The next step is the brief of argument, and here, of
course, comes into operation the individuality of the advocate. Each must present his case in the way that seems to
him the most effective, and I can only give you a few general observations. The printed brief of argument is the
packhorse that carries the burden of the case. Therefore
make it full, not necessarily long, but cover all your points
that you deem material. Subdivide and arrange it methodically under clear headings. Remember that the argument
is addressed to a court of seven judges whose minds will not
all work alike. On some points with which he is especially
familiar one judge may be with you from the start while
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another may desire to investigate further. Arrange your
brief so that the latter may readily find your authorities,
while the former may not waste time on the argument for a
view in which he already concurs.
Rule 33 requires: "When an authority is cited the principle intended to be proved by it must be stated, and a
naked reference to the book will not be sufficient. Pennsylvania cases decided since the commencement of the State
Reports must be cited by the volume of such State Reports."
This is a rule that gave much trouble at first. The elder
men who knew the cases as reported in Barr or Casey or
Harris did not take readily to the different mode of citation, but the new is the better method. I speak with experience and authority on this subject, for I grew up myself
under the old style, and I had some trouble to unlearn it,
but experience has shown that the new one is much the
better way, and getting more so every year. In citing
other reports do so by the full titles or by approved contractions. Reports have become so numerous that citing
by single initials or by very short abbreviations no longer
suffices. Accuracy requires the avoidance of all doubt as
to the reference intended. Therefore do not. let apparent
convenience lead you into the bad habit of using short
references. Do not, for instance, cite "75 F." for 75
Federal Reporter, as I have seen twice in paper books at
this present term. Don't write "Cyc." for a popular work
now in much use. The book-makers will try to persuade
you that everybody does it, and therefore it. must be right,
but it is not right, it is slovenly and bad. The book-publishers are your natural enemies. No sooner do they get
your shelves loaded with one work than they start another
which they tell you you must have. In this respect they are
very much like the fashion-makers, whose chief aim seems
to be to make this season's clothes so unlike the last that
you cannot possibly wear the old ones. Remember that
your arguments, including your citations, go into the reports not only for yourselves and your contemporaries, but
for the bar of the next fifty years or more. When I came
to the bar and for some years afterwards two series of
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reports were in very much use, English Common Law
Reports and English Law ,and Equity. They were cited
as E. C. L. R. and E. L. and E. The former was a Philadelphia enterprise for the republication of English reports
in full. They were well edited and had the advantage of
specifying on each volume the English reporter's name and
the number of the volume in his series. The latter was
a mixed selection of cases from various courts with a view
to their interest to American lawyers. The former is rarely
cited now, the latter practically never, and if in our reports
of forty or more years ago you find a case that you would
like to examine cited from E. L. and E., even if you remember what the letters E. L. and E. stand for, you will have
difficulty in learning where the case can be found in any
of the books now easily accessible. Such series are ephemeral and their day is usually short. Therefore if you must cite
any such sources give their titles in full, but do not cite
them at all if you can trace up the case and cite it, as you
usually can, from its proper volume in its official series.
The rule of court makes this mandatory in regard to Pennsylvania cases, and it is good practice in all others.
In citing text-books always give the edition , and it is
well to remember that text-books, modern ones, at least,
are not authoritative. They are convenient and valuable
as scientifically arranged indexes to decisions and as affording frequently the best form of expression of a recognized
legal principle. Unless cited only for this last feature,
examine the cases which they refer to and cite the best and
most applicable of those. As Coke expresses it, " Melius
est petere [ontes quant sectari rivulos."
Do not be led away to cite cases from other states however apposite until you are sure there is no case of our
own. Pennsylvania has developed a system of its own,
and has a long line of decisions beginning with the volumes
of Dallas, who was practically the first American reporter,
being antedated by Root in Connecticut by only a few
weeks. The early Philadelphia lawyers studied at the Inns
of Court, and they brought back profound learning in the
doctrines of the Common Law. The circumstances of the
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province led to such modification as best suited our own
institutions. In this -connection I would recommend to
you a very valuable address by the late Chief justice Sharswood before the Law Academy of Philadelphia on the
" Common Law of Pennsylvania." From these beginnings
the law of Pennsylvania has been developed into a consistent system of its own, and you as Pennsylvania lawyers
should strive to catch the true spirit of it. Therefore, the
first requisite of your argument is to give the Pennsylvania
authorities. The searching out of the cases is the work
of counsel. When the court finds Pennsylvania cases in
point that have not been cited by counsel a veil of doubt is
thrown over the whole brief as the result of haste or careless preparation. In Duggan v. B. & 0. R. R., I59 Pa.
248, the Court says: "The paper book of the appellant is
open to just complaint. In a rather full brief of cases from
other states not a single Pennsylvania decision is referred
to, although, as the opinion shows, there are several which
are much closer in point than any of those cited, and they
are, of course, much more authoritative with us than those
of other states however well reasoned. In the pressure of
business on this court we ought not to be called upon to
do counsel's work. It is not always possible to recall at
once even cases with which we are familiar, and we should
be able to rely on counsel for reference at least to everything relevant and material in our own reports. Counsel
who neglect this duty take a risk not fair either to the
court or their client." Reinforce your Pennsylvania cases
as you may be able from other states; often it is useful,
never hurtful, to know the law as other courts have held
it. It may be, even when there are Pennsylvania decisions,
that before the line of precedents has become too long and
too firmly established, an array from other states may cause
a revision in accord with a general current of authorities,
but if so it should be done in the open, and with full knowledge how far it is untrodden ground, or the path has been
already marked out.
The appendix, as prescribed by rule x9, should contain
the evidence and pleadings in full. In putting the evidence
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on record the court strongly recommends the bill of exceptions, or in its absence the certificate of the judge in the
prescribed form. The introduction of stenographers led
to the attempt to substitute the stenographer's notes for the
bill of exceptions, but it was not successful. The judge is
the responsible and authoritative head of the court and cannot be displaced from that position either by legislative
enactment or the indolence of counsel: Connell v. O'Neill,
154 Pa. 582. The bill of exceptions has stood the test of
six hundred years of practice, and no better method of getting matters in pais on the record has yet been invented. It
secures the authoritative certification of what took place
while it is yet fresh in the memory of counsel and court,
and though it costs a little, and only a little, more trouble
at the time, it often saves much more important trouble in
the end.
Rule 39 requires the paper books to be printed in ordinary
octavo size. The reason of this is convenience in handling,
as the court nearly always has a large number together.
Dr. Johnson said of Boswell that he was a "very clubbable
man," that is that he fitted well into the company wherever
lie happened to find himself, and the octavo paper book is
clubbable in the sense that it fits conveniently into the
bundle.
The cover should not be overloaded. Rule 39 sets forth
the real requirements. The number and term at the top,
followed by the title of the appellate court; then the names
of parties, and these should be stated exactly as they stand
on the appearance docket of the court below, with the addition of the single word "appellant" to the name of the
party taking the appeal; then the title of the court from
which the appeal is taken, with the statement "paper book
of appellant," or "appellee," as it may be, and the names of
the counsel whose book it is. Everything else is unnecessary and therefore objectionable.
The improvement in the retention of the title of the case
throughout, for improvement it is, was made by the act of
May 9, 1889, of which I have already spoken, and it is
the only good thing in the act. As said by Chief Justice
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Sterrett in Christner v. John, i 'i Pa. 527: "The justly
deserved criticisms (upon the act of 1889) were not intended to apply to the commendable provision in the second
section of the act which requires that the parties to any
appellate proceeding in this court shall be stated in the
same order in which they stood in the court below. The
practical utility of that provision is obvious." It enables
the court to see at a glance and to keep easily in mind the
position of the parties and the bearing of questions upon
their respective rights, yet notwithstanding these manifest
advantages, such is the inveteracy of professional habit that
to this day, after fifteen years of existence of the act, this
feature is often only partially obeyed, and not infrequently
disregarded altogether. You have the advantage that you
have no bad habits to unlearn and you can begin right.
At this point, apropos of habits, let me digress a few
moments from strict matter of law to one of less serious
but not unimportant consideration. Be careful of your
English. Do not allow yourselves to drift into the slipshod habit of saying Appellant and appellee. The words
are appellant and app6llee. Ap~ll~e, a bacchius in prosody,
does not run trippingly on the English-speaking tongue, in
fact the bacchic metre was not a favorite even with the
nimble-tongued Greeks, accustomed as they were to hard
words. Appell~e has therefore acquired some standing,
and perhaps, following the genius of the language to distinguish by change of accent words which are apt to run
too closely together, it is likely to establish its place, but it
is not yet correct, and for Appellant there is no excuse whatever.
Your profession will require of you the study and use of
language with accuracy. Whether in an argument on the
interpretation of a statute, the meaning of a contract, or
perhaps, most of all, the construction of a will, there will
be no time in which you will not be required to make close
study of the accurate use of words, and along with accuracy, hand-in-hand should go propriety and even elegance.
There is no collateral accomplishment that will better repay
your time and attention than the acquirement of a habit of
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correct and even elegant use of your native language. The
men who made the reputation of the Philadelphia bar were
as careful of their style as they were of their law. In fact,
one of the master orators who survived to my day, David
Paul Brown, carried this feeling perhaps to excess, and I
think would have been more mortified by a slip in pronunciation than by a slip in the statement of a legal proposition. It was their proud feeling that the standard of the
language of the bar did not yield to the standard of the
stage even in the palmy days of Garrick and Kean and the
Kembles. it is not uncommon to hear it said that the day
of oratory is over, but it is a mistake. The day of mere
declamation has gone by, but the day of oratory is unending. Style has changed, but the art has not perished or
lost its power. Oratory, at least of the bar, no longer
aims at entertainment, but confines itself to its true purpose,
to persuade or convince. For these ends it was never more
needed than now, and never more potent. Clear, orderly,
and forcible statement is the first step to victory to-day as
it always has been and always will be. The stage has
largely degenerated into burlesque and slang, and literature
tends to run into slovenly newspaper English. All the more
reason is there that you, the young men of the day,
to whom we look to maintain the ancient reputation of this
bar, should strive to do it in your clear and correct use of
language as well as in the learned and accurate statement
of the law.
Before leaving the subject of paper books I would remind you of the importance of proof-reading. In Tanney
v. Tanney, 159 Pa. 277, Mr. Justice Dean calls attention

to the importance of this part of counsel's duty: "Care
and accuracy in the preparation of paper books is as much
a professional duty as pointed and logical presentation of
a client's cause. While not seldom many authorities are
cited which have little or no bearing on the questions to
be decided, still our duty requires of us an examination
of all those which counsel points out to us as sustaining his
argument. In view of this he should correctly give us the
volume, page, and names of the parties in each citation."
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Rule 15 relates to motions for reargument. It does not
require any discussion except to call attention to the fact
that such motions are frequently founded on the failure of
the opinion of the court to notice some particular fact or
special argument of counsel. But that is a very ineffectual
ground for reargument. The court always considers the
whole case, but does not always think it necessary to prolong the opinion by separate mention or discussion of every
particular point made. it is only when some substantial
misconception of a really material fact appears clearly in
the opinion that the motion for reargument is likely to be
successfully made.
I come lastly to the oral argument. Here most of all it
is apparent that everything must depend on the individuality
of the counsel. Each must present his views in such method
and style as his own convictions and capabilities dictate.
All I can do is to present a few hints as to what is desirable
to do or to avoid. The printed argument in the paper book,
as already stated, is the packhorse to carry the burden of
the case. It is therefore loaded with all the points involved,
but in print all assignments of error, big and little, look
alike, and the space they occupy respectively is not always
in proportion to their relative importance. The office of
oral argument is to vitalize the inert print, to inform and
convince the court on the general bearing and really important issues of the case. It should therefore in some
respects be the opposite of the paper book. Dwell on the
main point, leaving the lesser ones to the book. The older
lawyer, who fought his case on common law issues, had
to study closely the real hinge on which it must finally
turn. Approximate that somewhat in your oral argument.
Study to know what you are to say, and say it, and then,
perhaps the most difficult part of all, know when you have
done. I doubt if any man, even the veteran in constant
training, has said when he sits down exactly what he intended when he got up to speak. Every man talks longer
than he thinks he will when he begins. It is one of the
little jokes the court have to themselves that when the
second counsel on the side opens by saying that he has but
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a few words to add to what his colleague has so well said,
the court look at the clock, with the confidence born of
experience that that speaker, unless stopped, is going to
talk twice as long as his colleague whom he has just complimented as having said all there was to say. The argument is somewhat like a battle, the plans must be modified by the movement of the enemy, but you should have
your plan and follow it as best you may. Whether to make
notes or not is a matter which must be determined by each
for himself. It tends to keep the speaker down to the
thread of his discourse, and not unduly to amplify any one
part, because he has before him the constant reminder that
there are others he has yet to treat of. But whether you
makes notes or not, consider carefully beforehand what
points you will touch on and what leave to your paper
book. Study what to say, therefore, but I would not recommend that you try to study the very words in which
to say it. Memorizing is to a certain extent trying to
follow the thread of thought and at the same time recall
a prepared phrase. It has always seemed to me somewhat like riding two horses at once, an acrobatic feat that
not everyone can do successfully. If you think out your
line of argument carefully, you will not often have any
difculty about the hour rule, or have occasion to ask for
additional time. Moreover, if you are talking directly to
the point, not repeating yourself and not unduly dilating
on what you have already made clear, the Court is not
likely to cut the thread without at least a timely warning.
This with other gifts or acquirements of advocacy must
be the result of practice and experience to each man in his
own case.
I bring these remarks to a close by recalling to you that
they are only hints to aid you in what, after all, you must
learn for yourselves by experience. My preceptor would
not allow me as a student to learn anything about practice.
He said there would be time enough for that when the
occasion came to warrant the study. It may have been a
good plan. It certainly confined my studies to legal principles, but it gave me more than one bad quarter of an hour
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to learn in the pinch of a contest what perhaps my adversary, a graduate as an office boy and not as a bachelor
of laws, had 'at his fingers' ends. You -will. find it, therefore, comfortable as well as advantageous to know something of practice, and if you have the rules and the reasons
for them well fixed in your minds, the actual application
will not be hard to learn. Accuracy of habit even in small
matters tends to cultivate accuracy of thought, and that I
need hardly say to you is the essential foundation in all
professional success.

